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Abstract: This paper derives the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically 
verifiable tasks are tied together, a cultural norm of behaviour coexists with a financial 
incentive, and public funding is also a concern. To formulate ideas, we restrict the 
attention to higher education. The model generates at least three results: First, the 
monetary incentive for research crowds out the social teaching norm, i.e., peer pressure. 
Second, increased intrinsic motivation in teaching induces a social multiplier effect on the 
teaching effort. Third, the government under-funds the university if the teaching standard 
is lower than that of the government to implement its standard. 
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“In ancient times scholars worked for their own improvement; nowa-
days they seek only to win the approval of others.”
Confucius, Analects 14.24 (551-479 BCE).
1 Introduction
One of the most prevailing characteristics of modern universities is their
dual mission of teaching and research. Historically, these tasks were com-
plements: research was brought into universities as an input to instruction
while instruction was supposed to fuel research.1 Nowadays, we question
this relationship. The trade-off between research and teaching also relates to
a broader spectrum of institutional issues. In particular, European univer-
sities are said to suffer from poor governance, insufficient autonomy, and
often inadequate incentives and funding (Aghion et al., 2010; Gary-Bobo
and Trannoy, 2009).
In general, university professors are motivated agents exerting more
than the required minimum effort level (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2005, 2008;
Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008). However, exerting effort is a question of in-
tensity and allocation between tasks (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991).2 Be-
cause teaching is harder to assess relative to research, and promotion de-
cisions mainly hinge on research performance, it is common for professors
to focus on research at the expense of teaching. Furthermore, research is
a self-promoting investment, visible for the scientific community and the
public, whereas the teaching activity is less tangible, a more local good.3 De-
signing adequate incentives in such an environment is not straightforward.
1 See Goldin and Katz (1999) for this historical development in the United States.
2 Kerr (1975) revealed the multitask problem but not in a principal-agent framework.
3 One could argue research provides private returns (academic authorship), while teaching
is a public good.
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Both theoretical- and empirical research confirm the problem of multitask-
ing: people respond too well to monetary incentives, making it difficult to
provide financial incentives for a bundle of tasks. The reason is twofold.
First, encouraging effort in one activity crowds out effort in the other, i.e.,
the effort substitution problem. Hence, the principal must balance incentives
across tasks for the agent to exert a dual effort. Second, the principal can
only offer high-powered financial incentives if the two tasks are equally and
easily measured. If outputs are asymmetrically measured, the agent will game
the system and ignore the less/non-observable activity. At the extreme, if
the principal cares about both tasks, it may be best to offer no financial in-
centives at all.
The standard multitask model ignores that cultural norms of behavior
- developed over time - also influence the agent’s effort provision. Effort
provision may stem from many sources, such as interests, ability, health,
and moral incentives (Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007). This paper focuses on
how colleagues influence the conduct of the agent. The existence of a social
norm implies that the agent’s effort converges towards the level of effort es-
tablished by peers (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Cultural and social incentives,
defined as the shared body of beliefs in an organization, can be engineered -
and motivate - in the same manner as financial incentives. Hence, there are
several alternative incentive schemes whose efficiency and adequacy ought
to be considered.4
In this paper, we analyze how a university with a limited budget should
exploit the existence of a teaching norm to install a financial research in-
centive and thereby motivate professors to allocate effort into teaching and
4 Holmström and Milgrom (1994) argue that incentives within an organization create a
system. Academia is a prominent example of such as it gathers many types of incentives
whose interplay shapes professors.
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research. Put differently, we inquire about how to modify a moral hazard
incentive contract when a cultural norm secures the provision of the non-
financial and non-contractual task, and the allocation of public funds is also
a concern.
To analyze these issues, we consider a framework with three partici-
pants: the government, the university, and a group of identical professors
(i.e., the agent). The university observes the agent’s research production but
not the teaching output.5 There is a norm for teaching with two sources: the
agent’s intrinsic motivation and a social component in terms of peer pressure
given by the average teaching effort exerted by peers (Ficher and Huddart,
2008). Whereas a research norm may coexist, we focus on how a norm-
driven and non-contractual task (teaching), based on intrinsic motivation
and peer pressure, can secure the use of a financial incentive attached to the
observable and contractual activity (research).
The government funds the university. The university then pays each
professor a fixed base wage and a marginal reward, depending on the re-
search production. We assume the (public) university maximizes the re-
search production under the constraint that the norm-driven teaching ac-
tivity reaches a certain standard.6 Teaching standards may reflect differ-
ent higher education systems, e.g., full-time teaching, full-time research, or
teaching plus research.
We first study the problem of the agent. We show that the research incen-
tive crowds out the teaching norm. A higher research incentive diverts the
5 In compulsory education, teacher pay may depend on student achievement (e.g., Lavy,
2009). However, in higher education, professors provide two tasks, and students in-
dulge in self-learning (Rosen, 1987), making it harder to assess the agent’s contribution.
Even though evaluations of teaching may exist, research outcomes are more tangible than
teaching outcomes.
6 Although private universities maximize profit, a teaching standard could also exist in
private universities. We neglect the direct role of students. The quality of teaching, how-
ever, is regulated by the teaching standard.
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agent away from teaching, and in turn, lowers the social component of the
teaching norm. That is, both effort substitution and a lower peer pressure
diminish the agent’s teaching effort. For low levels of the research incentive,
a reduced social norm outweighs the benefit of a higher financial incentive.
Hence, the agent’s utility declines because the teaching norm is negatively
affected.
We then consider the problem of the university, i.e., the design of the
optimal contract. First, the university needs a minimum amount of public
funds for the agent to participate. Once attained this minimum, we show
that the agent’s research production increases with the funds available. At
first, the professor produces too much teaching relative to the teaching stan-
dard and too little research. The university cannot change the situation
because of the low funding. As the funding increases, the university can
augment the marginal research reward. Hence, the professor’s teaching ef-
fort decreases and comes closer to the teaching standard, while the effort
devoted to research increases. Also, we show that the university can in-
duce the agent to exert a higher research effort when the agent’s intrinsic
motivation in teaching increases. The university can transform the agent’s
higher intrinsic teaching motivation into a higher research effort by decreas-
ing the base wage and increasing the marginal research reward, making the
university better off. The agent otherwise exerts too much teaching effort
relative to the teaching standard. However, the rise in the explicit research
incentive cannot compensate for the total increase in the agent’s intrinsic
teaching motivation if the university is budget constrained. If constrained
by the budget, the agent’s teaching effort also increases. The teaching ef-
fort increases beyond the teaching standard due to a social multiplier effect
driven by peer pressure and effort substitution.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/320 5
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Finally, we examine the problem of the government. The government
has the same objective as the university but may target a different teach-
ing standard. We show that if the government’s teaching standard is higher
than that of the university, the government under-funds the university to
implement its standard. If, on the other hand, the university’s teaching stan-
dard is higher than that of the government, the government funds the uni-
versity so that the agent exerts the research effort compatible with the uni-
versity’s teaching standard (hence, also the government’s standard). Note
there is no asymmetric information between the university and the govern-
ment regarding the teaching standard(s).
There has been a substantial body of research on multitasks issues in
the wake of Holmström and Milgrom’s (1991) seminal article. Some schol-
ars focus on reinstating high-powered incentives and balancing incentives
among tasks with opposite characteristics (Sinclair-Desgagné, 1999; Auriol
et al., 2002; Canton, 2005). We follow this line by scrutinizing how a cultural
norm of behavior can buffer against a high-powered financial incentive in a
multitask environment with asymmetrically verifiable tasks. Note that the
multitask theory also includes task separation and the optimal clustering of
activities (e.g., Dewatripont et al., 2000). We do not address these issues here
as we focus on the two tasks tied together.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the norm-based multi-
task moral hazard model. Section 3 derives the optimal compensation con-
tract the university should offer the agent and indicates how the govern-
ment should fund the university. Section 4 concludes.
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press 6
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2 The model
We analyze a principal-management-agent model where the government
is the principal, the university is the management, and professors are agents.
They are all risk-neutral. Agents are often risk-averse in principal-agent
models. However, to focus on the interplay between the norm and the fi-
nancial incentive, we assume risk-neutral agents.
There is a unit mass of identical agents (professors). Each agent supplies
a two-dimensional effort allocated to teaching and research, where er repre-
sents the agent’s research effort, and et represents the agent’s teaching effort.
The efforts are not observable to the university. Moreover, outputs are ran-
dom. We denote yr the agent’s stochastic production in research and yt the
agent’s stochastic production in teaching. We assume expected outputs are
E (yr) = er and E (yt) = et.
As moral hazard may occur, the management (university) opts to de-
sign an optimal reward schedule, offering a linear contract to the agent.
We assume the agent’s research production is measurable while the agent’s
teaching production is unverifiable, hence cannot be contracted.7 We as-
sume that teaching is a norm-driven, non-financial task.8 Thus, the univer-
sity can write a contract of the form m = αyr + w, where w is the agent’s
base wage, and α is the performance-related component associated with the
7 An unverifiable task means that there exists no hard measure to assess it. Thus, it cannot
be contracted upon as courts of law cannot resolve any dispute between parties.
8 Several scholars study the non-measurable aspects of teaching. Holmström and Mil-
grome (1991) study agents teaching basic skills and high-order thinking skills. The latter
cannot be measured. Hence, there are two activities, but only one is observable. They
show when inputs are substitutes, to provide incentives for the non-measured activity,
the reward for the other task must be reduced. Sinclair-Desgagné (1999) considers a non-
linear performance scheme. There is one supervised activity (e.g., education), whereas
the other activity is subject to auditing (e.g., research). The principal audits the agent
only if the performance of the supervised task is good. The agent obtains a bonus if
audited and performing well.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/320 7
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agent’s research production. The agent has a reservation utility, UA0 . The
agent accepts the contract if the (expected) utility from participation out-
weighs the reservation level.
The compensation scheme depends on public funding from the princi-
pal: the university pays each professor a fixed base wage and a marginal
research reward given the funding m from the government. A university
is often a utility-maximizing entity subject to a budget constraint, whereas
the government, presented with a social welfare function, behaves analo-
gously. In this model, we incorporate a teaching standard as part of the ob-
jective function of both the university and the government (see sections 3.2
and 3.3). The teaching standard of the university and the government may
differ. Teaching standards reflect different higher education systems, e.g.,
full-time teaching, full-time research, or teaching plus research. Note, there
is no asymmetric information between the government and the university
regarding the teaching standard(s).9
In contrast to the standard multitask model, the agent derives utility
from a norm.10 We will study if the norm fuels the non-contractual activ-
ity and permits a financial incentive of the contractual activity. The agent’s
(expected) utility function reads:






e2t − keret (1)
α is the marginal research reward; er determines the research production;
9 Since the need for more complex hierarchical structures than the standard two-tiered
organization, principal-agent models have incorporated a supervisor who monitors the
agent. These models introduce the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and
the agent, e.g., Tirole (1986). We do not study collusion. We focus on the funding role of
the government.
10 In a standard multitask model, there are two tasks and two financial incentives. In this
model, one financial incentive and one cultural norm.
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w is the base wage; n is a norm for teaching (more on this below), and et
determines the teaching production. The cost function captures the agent’s
disutility of effort and consists of quadratic costs plus an interaction term:
1
2
e2r reflects the cost of producing research and
1
2
e2t reflects the cost of produc-
ing teaching. The two efforts are weak substitutes, 0 < k < 1: raising effort
on one task increases the marginal cost of effort on the other task, i.e., the
effort substitution problem. We assume no task-specific abilities. In other
words, the agent performs no task more efficiently than the other. Hence,
the agent’s effort costs are equal for the two tasks.11 We define the maximum
value of uA as:
UA (α,w) = uA(α,w, n∗ (α) , e∗r (α) , e
∗
t (α)) (2)
Note ∗ indicates the endogenous values of the norm and the two efforts.
2.1 The norm
Elster (1989) argues that an individual’s action emanates from self-interest
and norms. A norm may emerge from: cognitive aspects - people may in-
vest in some understandings of themselves and wish to preserve these im-
ages for themselves and others; innate preferences - individuals may like
to conform to the behavior of their peer group; or social interactions and
power relations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). In this paper, we assume that
the agent is conforming with peers. Kandel and Lazear (1992) note that
sociologists have long been aware of the importance of peer pressure and
reference groups. The social-psychological literature underscores that peo-
11 The marginal effort cost may depend on ability, aptitude, and other attributes. To focus
on reinstating high-powered incentives in a multitask environment with asymmetrically
measured tasks, we assume the agent’s task abilities are symmetric concerning costs. See
Thiele (2010) for task-specific abilities in a multitask principal-agent model.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/320 9
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ple have strong preferences to behave similarly to those around them (e.g.,
Asch, 1951).
Incorporating a norm into a multitask environment of asymmetric mea-
sured activities means that in addition to the contractual research output
(where α and w are the contract parameters), the agent gets valuable non-
contractual payoff regarding teaching. Consistent with the social identity
theory of Tajfel and Turner (1979), we assume that the agent adheres to
a personal effort target and a social peer norm. Hence, the agent derives
utility from intrinsic motivation in teaching (exogenous) and peer pressure
(endogenous). Formally, we build on Ficher and Huddart (2008). They in-
corporate norms into a principal-agent model, studying how norms influ-
ence organizational boundaries - not how they shape the optimal incentive
scheme. The teaching norm reads:
n = λt+ (1− λ) et (3)
λ (0 < λ < 1) represents the weight the agent puts on the effort target, t,
relative to the average teaching effort of peers, et.12 The norm function n
(which is differentiable) is hence a weighted average of the agent’s (exoge-
nous) intrinsic teaching motivation and the (endogenous) social teaching
norm related to peer pressure. A higher level of either type inclines the
agent to work harder in teaching (for a given level of the financial incen-
tive), although the source of motivation is different. A higher λ indicates
that the agent puts more emphasis on implicit teaching motivation. A lower
λ implies that the agent chooses a higher teaching effort in response to an
12 The exogenous personal teaching target, t, may be thought of as intrinsic motivation in
teaching, a morally desirable action, altruism toward students, or status concern for the
profession.
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press 10
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increased teaching effort of peers. We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: λ > k. The agent’s weight on the personal effort target in
teaching is larger than the substitution of effort.
Assumption 2: The agent is a norm-taker, i.e., each professor is atomistic
and takes the social teaching norm as given. The agent observes and cor-
rectly anticipates the way of behaving in his or her peer group.
Assumption 1 says that the extent to which the effort in one task crowds out
the effort in the other task (k) must be smaller than the importance of the
intrinsic motivation of the norm-based activity (λ). It makes sense that the
weight on the exogenous part of the norm is higher than the effort substi-
tution when the two tasks are tied together: it enables the agent to provide
a dual effort. Only in this way can the cultural norm (for teaching) buffer
against the financial (research) reward. Empirically, it is demanding to spec-
ify the levels of λ and k. We assume that teaching and research are weak
substitutes. Hence, k is low. Assumption 2 underscores that one professor
alone is not the norm-maker: the agent adheres to the effort norm estab-
lished by peers. We assume the agent observes the average teaching effort
exerted by colleagues. That is, correctly anticipates the behavior of his or
her reference group. In contrast, as already noted, the university (i.e., the
management) cannot observe effort. Assumptions 1 and 2 make intuitive
the interplay between the norm (n) and the financial incentive (α). If they
do not hold, the teaching norm cannot secure the provision of the research
incentive, and the agent cannot, in an easy way, internalize the social norm
component into his or her utility function.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/320 11
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3 The Optimal Compensation Contract
First, we derive the agent’s optimal effort levels (conditional on accept-
ing the offer). Then, we solve the maximization problem of the university:
We derive the optimal base wage and the optimal marginal research reward
(conditional on the university received funding from the government). Fi-
nally, we study how the government should fund the university.
3.1 The Effort Choice of the Agent
Maximizing the agent’s utility (expression (1)) with respect to efforts
yields the following system of equations:
e∗r = α− ke∗t (4)
e∗t = n− ke∗r (5)
Naturally, the agent’s research effort increases with the monetary incentive,
α, whereas the agent’s teaching effort increases with the norm, n. The neg-
ative cross-partial derivatives are associated with the technological depen-
dence of the two tasks: the effort in one task crowds out the effort in the
other task, i.e., the effort substitution problem.
As agents are identical, they provide the same teaching effort at equilib-
rium.13 In consequence, the average teaching effort of the agent’s peers, i.e.,
the social component of the norm, is equal to the agent’s teaching effort:
we have e∗t = e∗t . Using that the endogenous value of the norm function
13 Introducing heterogeneous agents (along t) made the analytical solution impossible. See
Donze and Gunnes (2018) for a norm-based one-task model with heterogeneous agents.
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press 12
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equals n∗ = λt + (1− λ) e∗t , we rearrange equations (4) and (5) and obtain
the agent’s optimal effort levels:













(α, 0) if α ≥ λt
k
(6)






. For t = 0, there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium where the
optimal teaching effort, e∗t (α), is zero. Thus, to exert teaching effort, the
agent must be endowed with a positive level of t. A large body of literature
suggests that individuals find interest in their work and derive satisfaction
from it (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Stern, 2003; Canton, 2005; Aghion et al., 2008;
Besley and Ghatak, 2005, 2008; Fehr and Falk, 2008). Hence, a positive t is
plausible.14
In the following, we study two mechanisms embedded in the model. They
emerge because the substitution of effort (k) and the social component of
the teaching norm (e∗t = e∗t (α)) break the non-separability of the two efforts.
Together, resulting in a crowding-out effect (a higher financial research incen-
tive reduces the teaching effort, due to effort substitution, and in turn also
the endogenous peer norm which lowers the agent’s teaching effort even
further) and a social multiplier effect (a higher intrinsic teaching motivation
increases the teaching effort by more than the increase in intrinsic motiva-
14 How to select intrinsically motivated professors and regulate the social norm are beyond
the scope of this paper. See Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) for the screening of worker moti-
vation and Donze and Gunnes (2018) for how to regulate a social norm.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/320 13
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 12, Issue 1, Spring 2021, Article 1
tion due to peer pressure and effort substitution).
3.1.1 Crowding-out Effect
We first study the effect on the optimal efforts (e∗r (α) , e∗t (α)) of modifying
the marginal research incentive, α, when the two tasks are tied together,





. Recall, for a lower (higher) power of the financial in-
centive, the agent only provides effort in teaching (research). According to
(6), the agent’s optimal research effort is increasing in the financial research
incentive, ∂e∗r (α) /∂α > 0, whereas the agent’s optimal teaching effort is
decreasing in the financial research incentive, ∂e∗t (α) /∂α < 0, as k > 0.
Hence, effort devoted to research increases as research becomes more re-
warding, whereas effort devoted to teaching decreases because of the sub-
stitution of effort. More surprisingly, an increase in the financial research






for 1 > λ > k > 0. The crowding-out of the endogenous teaching norm,
n∗ (α), by the financial research incentive, α, stems from the substitution of
effort, measured by k, and the social component in n∗ (α), i.e., e∗t = e∗t (α).
First, a higher financial research incentive diverts the agent away from teach-
ing due to k > 0. Then, the substitution of effort lowers the social norm, i.e.,
the peer pressure for teaching. Thus, the agent’s teaching effort decreases
further. The crowding-out effect is larger for a smaller λ. The more weight
the agent puts on the social incentive, the more the teaching effort dimin-
ishes due to decreased peer effort. If teaching and research were technolog-
ically independent tasks (k = 0), there would be no crowding-out effect. If
technological complements rather than substitutes (k < 0), there would be
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press 14
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a crowding-in effect instead.
For low values of α (albeit higher than tk), the crowding-out effect gen-
erates an undesirable effect on the agent’s utility. To understand why we


















is given by (7), and ∂U
A
∂α
= e∗r (α). For





, is more important than the increase in utility due to a higher
financial research incentive, ∂U
A
∂α
. That is, the loss due to a less gratifying
teaching environment outweighs the extra benefit of a higher financial re-




λ2 + k2 − 2λk2
(9)





. To the right of α = tk and until α̂, UA
decreases in α. From α = α̂, the benefit associated with a higher financial
incentive exceeds the utility loss generated by the decreased norm. We sum
up the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Conditional on contract acceptance:





2. For any base wage, w (α):
• Maximum agent utility UA(α,w) decreases in the explicit research in-
centive for α ∈ [tk, α̂].
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• Maximum agent utility UA(α,w) increases in the explicit research in-
centive for α ≥ α̂.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in the marginal research reward crowds
out the social teaching norm, and for certain low levels of the monetary in-
centive, it has an undesirable effect on the agent’s utility. Usually, crowding-
out effects stem from a financial incentive eroding the agent’s implicit mo-
tivation. In this model, the crowding-out effect manifests itself through the
effort substitution and a subsequent reduction in peer pressure. Note there
would be no crowding-out effect in a one-task version of this norm-based
principal-agent model, indicating that the substitution of effort initiates the
crowding-out.
3.1.2 The Social Multiplier Effect
We now study the effect on the optimal efforts (e∗r (α) , e∗t (α)) of modifying
the agents personal teaching target t (or the weight λ on t in the teaching





. Note that t is
not a contract parameter. A modified t represents a change in the type of
agent. According to (6), increasing t (or λ) increases the optimal teaching
effort (∂e∗t (α) /∂λ > 0; ∂e∗t (α) /∂t > 0) and decreases the optimal research
effort (∂e∗r (α) /∂λ < 0; ∂e∗r (α) /∂t < 0) due to effort substitution (i.e., k > 0).
Moreover, an increase in the agent’s intrinsic motivation creates a multiplier







The multiplier augments as λ decreases, i.e., when the weight is redistributed
away from the personal teaching target to the social teaching norm. It also
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increases with the substitution of effort, k. There is a large literature on
social multipliers (e.g., Huck et al., 2012). However, few papers are con-
cerned with a social multiplier in a multitask environment. To understand
the underlying mechanisms driving the multiplier, suppose t increases by
4t. In a first-round, the teaching norm, whose endogenous value equals
n∗ = λt + (1− λ) e∗t , increases by λ4t. In turn, e∗t increases by the same
amount. This increase has two consequences in a second round. First,
the teaching norm increases by (1 − λ)λ4t. Second, the research effort,
e∗r = α − ke∗t , decreases by kλ4t, allowing for a subsequent increase in
e∗t by substitution. Hence, in total, an increase by (1 − λ)λ4t + k2λ4t in
the second round. Anew, e∗t increases by the same amount. Summing the
successive increases, we obtain:
4et =
[





Expression (11) indicates that the multiplier expands with the weight on
the peer norm. Whereas the agent’s teaching effort increases with λ, the
social multiplier effect is amplified if the agent adheres to peer pressure,
i.e., if the agent has a low λ. First, an increase in t augments the agent’s
effort e∗t . Then, there is an additional effect through the rise in the teaching
effort of peers. This second effect influences the agent more the lower the
agent’s λ. The effort substitution also amplifies the multiplier: an increase
in t increases e∗t , which reduces e∗r , and by substitution increases e∗t again.
Although the substitution of effort increases the social multiplier effect, it is
not the catalyst. There would be a social multiplier effect also in a one-task
version of this norm-based principal-agent model.
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/320 17
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3.2 The Maximization Problem of the University
We assume the university targets a certain standard in teaching. As long
as the agent’s teaching effort is below this threshold, the university does
not attach any importance to research. If attaining the minimum level, the
university starts appreciating the agent’s research effort but not the teach-
ing effort beyond the standard, indicating the university’s objective is to
maximize the expected research effort under the constraint that the teach-
ing effort cannot fall below a certain level. The university’s utility reads:
max
α
UU = 1(e∗t (α)<eUt )







where 1 is the indicator function, and eUt is the teaching standard of the
university.
In addition to the standard of the norm-driven task, the university faces a
budget constraint. It receives public funds equal to m from the government
and must allocate it between the fixed and the variable parts of the agent’s
compensation scheme, αe∗r (α) + w ≤ m. The university chooses the lowest
base wage compatible with the agent’s participation. The base wage pro-
viding the agent with his or her reservation utility, w0 (α), is defined as the
solution inw to the implicit equation UA0 = UA(α,w). For the agent to partic-
ipate and secure that the agent will attain the teaching standard, e∗t (α) ≥ eUt ,
we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3: (i) m ≥ UAo − 12t
2 > 0 and (ii) t ≥ eUt .
2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press 18
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The first part of Assumption 3 indicates that the university needs a mini-
mum amount of public funds to make the agent participate. The university
must, at least, cover the agent’s base wage when the agent is only providing
the norm-based task, i.e., teaching. Assumption 3 guarantees that w0 (α) ≥ 0
when α is not too high.15 The Appendix provides the expression of w0 (α).
The second part of Assumption 3 indicates that the agent’s intrinsic teaching
motivation, t, must be higher or equal to the university’s teaching standard.
Put differently: The university relies on intrinsic motivation to attain the
teaching standard. If t < eUt , the agent cannot reach the university’s mini-
mum required teaching effort. Recall, the maximum teaching effort is t (for
m = UA0 − 12t
2 and α = tk).
To maximize its objective function, the university chooses a financial re-
search reward that satisfies the teaching standard and the budget constraint
(imposed by the government). We first study the constraint related to the
university’s teaching standard. Let us denote αt the solution in α to eUt =
e∗t (α). That is, αt is the financial research incentive yielding the teaching







λt− eUt (λ− k2)
k
(14)
To induce the agent to provide an teaching effort at least equal to eUt , the
university should choose a financial research incentive no higher than αt.
15 For α ≥ λt/k, that is, when e∗t (α) = 0, UA increases without bound.
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The higher the teaching standard, eUt , the lower the financial research incen-
tive αt due to effort substitution. One can verify that αt = tk when eUt = t
while αt = λt/k when eUt = 0. Hence, αt ∈ [tk, λt/k].
αt is increasing in λ and t. The intuition is as follows: For a low λ, that
is, the agent is more focused on the social (endogenous) component of the
teaching norm relative to the implicit (exogenous) teaching motivation, the
teaching effort is more sensitive to the power of the research incentive due
to the higher importance of peer pressure. Choosing a high research incen-
tive would result in a low teaching effort, not sufficiently compensated by a
higher research effort. For a high λ, i.e., the agent is more devoted to intrin-
sic motivation than the social component of the norm, the teaching effort is
less sensitive to the power of the financial incentive due to lower weight on
peer pressure. Choosing a high-powered research incentive would trigger
a higher research effort without reducing the teaching effort too much. In
short, a higher λ decreases the importance of the crowding-out effect previ-
ously explained.
When t increases, the agent is more intrinsically motivated for teaching,
so the agent’s participation constraint is relaxed (see Assumption 3). In con-
sequence, the university can offer a lower base wage and a higher financial
research incentive: we have ∂αt/∂t > 0.16 We study this relationship in
detail in the subsequent sub-section. It is worth noting that we avoid the
standard trade-off between risk and incentives as we assume risk-neutral
agents.
We now examine the optimal α given the budget constraint. We denote αm
16 Intrinsic motivation is additively separable in the agent’s utility function, so the univer-
sity always prefers the agent to be intrinsically motivated as it increases the marginal
utility from the transfer. (It is equivalent to a reduction in the disutility of effort).
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the solution in α to the implicit equation αe∗r (α) + w0 (α) = m. That is,
αm corresponds to the situation where the university is budget-constrained
and spends m financing the agent’s base wage and the marginal research
reward. Assumption 3 guarantees that αm exists. The expression of αm is
given in the Appendix. Note that αm is non-decreasing in m.
Given the budget constraint and the teaching standard of the university, the
optimal financial research incentive is:
α∗ (m) = min (αm, αt) (15)
In other words, the optimal research reward must ensure that the university
can finance the contract and yield at least the teaching effort required by the
teaching standard.
Let m denote the amount of public funds such that αm = αt. We have two
constrained cases (for a given teaching standard and budget). Whenm < m,
the university is budget constrained. In this case, the university can provide
αm to the agent where αm < αt. In turn, the agent exerts an effort in teach-
ing above the university’s minimum teaching standard. When m ≥ m, the
teaching standard restricts the university. In this case, the university can pro-
vide a higher financial research incentive to the agent but not beyond αt, i.e.,
αm = αt. In turn, the agent exerts an effort in teaching equal to the mini-
mum standard of the university. We summarize the results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2
1. αm is non-decreasing in m. However, as eUt ≥ 0, α∗ (m) cannot go beyond
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αt.
2. If αt > α̂ (i.e., eUt is low), w∗ = w0 (α∗ (m)) is first increasing then decreas-
ing in m.
3. If αt ≤ α̂ (i.e., eUt is high), w∗ = w0 (α∗ (m)) is monotonically increasing in
m.
Proposition 2 states that the optimal marginal research reward, α∗ (m), in-
creases with the government fundingm if the agent is attaining the teaching
standard, i.e., e∗t (α∗ (m)) ≥ eUt . The teaching standard represents the type
of university: eUt = 0 represents a full-time research university, whereas
eUt = t represents a full-time teaching university. We focus on the two tasks
tied together, i.e., the university provides both research and teaching, hence
α∗ (m) cannot go beyond αt. Regarding the optimal base wage, w∗, recall UA
reaches a minimum at α̂. For a low teaching standard, the university must,
as m increases, first provide the agent with a higher base wage to compen-
sate for the lower social teaching norm, i.e., the crowding-out effect. Then,
as m increases further, α∗ (m) becomes sufficiently high (i.e., α∗ (m) > α̂) to
allow for a decrease in the base wage. For a high teaching standard, the uni-
versity attains m quickly as m increases due to the high standard, so α∗ (m)
cannot become sufficiently powerful to allow for a decrease in the base wage
(i.e., α∗ (m) < α̂). Figure 1 sums up for m ≤ m and αt > α̂, i.e., the university
is budget-constrained and the teaching standard is low.
3.2.1 Comparative statics: Increased intrinsic motivation
The agent generates valuable non-contractual payoff to the university in
terms of teaching due to the norm, i.e., intrinsic motivation in teaching and
peer pressure. We now study how increased intrinsic motivation in teaching
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Figure 1. The model for m ≤ m and αt > α̂
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affects the optimal financial research incentive (α∗ (m)) and the two optimal
effort levels (e∗t (α∗ (m)) , e∗t (α∗ (m))). Note that t is not a contract parameter.
A modified t represents a change in the type of agent. We consider the case
where m ≤ m (hence, αm ≤ αt), i.e., the university is budget-constrained
and induces the agent to exert too much effort in teaching relative to its
teaching standard.
When t increases, the agent is more intrinsically motivated for teaching
and the participation constraint is relaxed. In consequence, the university




> 0.17 The expression of α∗ (m) when αm ≤ αt is given in

















. That is, the lower the teaching standard of the




Regarding the two effort levels, we start with the teaching effort. Differ-
entiating e∗t (α∗ (m) , t) with respect to t, we obtain:
de∗t (α























, the positive effect of the social multiplier on the agent’s teaching
effort outweighs the negative impact on the agent’s teaching effort caused






17 The ability to transform increased implicit teaching motivation into higher research effort
lies upon the assumption that the agent has no task-specific abilities. With asymmetric
effort costs, this transformation may have been harder to achieve.
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Differentiating e∗r (α∗ (m) , t) with respect to t, we obtain:
de∗r (α





















≥ k, the positive effect on the agent’s research effort due to an
increase in α∗ (m) outweighs the negative impact on the agent’s research ef-





> 0. We summarize
the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
Consider the case where m ≤ m. If the agent’s intrinsic motivation in teaching




The agent then exerts a higher research effort, de∗r (α∗ (m) , t) /dt > 0, but also a
higher teaching effort, de∗t (α∗ (m) , t) /dt > 0.
Proposition 3 stems from an initial situation where m ≤ m, i.e., the univer-
sity is budget constrained. When t increases, the university can transform
the agent’s higher intrinsic teaching motivation into increased research ef-
fort by modifying the contract (increasing αm and decreasing w∗). This
makes the university better off: otherwise, the agent exerts too much ef-
fort in teaching relative to the teaching standard. Put differently, there is
a crowding-in effect of the agent’s higher intrinsic teaching motivation on
the agent’s research effort. There are two things worth noting: First, the in-
crease in αm cannot completely compensate for the rise in t because of the
low budget m, i.e., αm ≤ αt. In consequence, the agent’s teaching effort,
notably due to the social multiplier effect, also increases despite not being
valued by the university. Second, the amount of public funds m required
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to attain αm = αt increases with t. That is, the amount of public funding
required for the teaching effort to fall to the university’s teaching standard
increases when t augments. In fact, αt increases with t and m is increasing
in αt. Hence, m is also increasing in t.18 (See Figure 1.)
3.3 The Funding from the Government
The government chooses its funding policy: it allocates m to the univer-
sity.19 The objective of the government is the same as the one of the univer-
sity, but its teaching standard, eGt , is not necessarily the same as the teaching
standard of the university, eUt . We have:
max
m
UG = 1(e∗t (α∗(m))<eGt )
[e∗t (α








where α∗ (m) is given by (15).
Proposition 4
If the teaching standard of the university is lower than that of the government,
eUt ≤ eGt , the government chooses a lower allocation than m, i.e., m∗ ≤ m. In
doing so, the government induces the university to choose its standardeGt . If the
teaching standard of the university is higher than that of the government, eUt ≥ eGt ,
the government chooses an allocation equal to m, i.e., m∗ = m. The government
then induces the agent to exert the maximal research effort compatible with the





2 − 12 (e
∗
t (αt))
2. As 12 (er(αt))
2 − 12 (et(αt))
2 is increasing in
αt and αt is increasing in t, then m is also increasing in t.
19 Several papers study funding. De Fraja (2016) studies how funds should be distributed
among research institutions with unobserved and varying productivity. Gary-Bobo and
Trannoy (1998) examine a principal-agent relationship where a university has a local
monopoly of higher education provision. Del Rey (2001) considers a two-stage game
between two universities that maximize student productivity and utility derived from
research. Four types of equilibria, differing according to preferences, technologies, and
public policy, are identified: full-time teaching, full-time research, selective teaching plus
research, and mass teaching plus research.
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teaching standard of the university eUt (and hence eGt ).
To attain the teaching standard, the government has no interest in providing
a higher financial research incentive than that offered by the university.
4 Conclusion
We introduce a norm into a multitask moral hazard model and apply it to
academia. The cultural norm fosters effort in teaching (non-contractual ac-
tivity), whereas a financial incentive encourages research effort (contractual
task). We study the interplay between the cultural norm and the financial
incentive and determine the optimal compensation contract the university
should offer professors when the provision of public funds is also a concern.
Incorporating a norm into a multitask model with asymmetrically mea-
sured tasks leads to different results than the standard multitask model with
two financial incentives. According to our norm-based model, academia
may benefit from offering a financial research incentive if a cultural teaching
norm exists. We add three assumptions regarding the norm-driven teaching
activity. Intrinsic motivation and the importance of peers for compliance to
a social norm, together with a financial incentive, can motivate professors
to exert a dual effort, thereby promoting efficiency in higher education in-
stitutions. That is, although incentives still must be balanced across tasks,
an effort norm can work in tandem with a financial incentive.
The model generates at least three results. First, increasing the marginal
research incentive crowds out the social teaching norm. For low levels of the
financial incentive, the agent’s utility decreases. The reduction in peer pres-
sure outweighs the gain from a higher monetary reward. Hence, for the re-
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search incentive to be effective, a certain level of public funds is required to
go against the crowding-out effect. Second, if the intrinsic teaching motiva-
tion increases, the university can induce the agent to exert a higher research
effort. The university can transform the higher teaching motivation into
a higher research effort by decreasing the agent’s base wage and increasing
the research incentive. Converting implicit teaching motivation into explicit
research motivation is more facile with increased public funding. If budget
constrained, the rise in the financial incentive cannot compensate for the in-
creased intrinsic motivation. Hence, the agent’s teaching effort, notably due
to a social multiplier effect, also increases. Third, if the university’s teaching
standard is lower than that of the government, the government under-funds
the university. By doing so, the government implements its teaching stan-
dard. If, on the other hand, the university’s teaching standard is higher
than the government’s teaching standard, the government funds the uni-
versity so that the agent exerts the maximal research effort compatible with
the university’s teaching standard (and hence the government’s standard).
Note that whereas many papers study crowding-out and social multiplier
effects, they are seldom examined in a multitask framework. In this model,
the substitution of effort, i.e., the key ingredient in a multitask model, fuels
both effects.
The model consists of two stylized facts: individuals respond to incen-
tives, and contracts govern economic relationships. Testable implications
are to compare the effectiveness of different incentive schemes. Notably, do
universities that offer financial research incentives and rely on a teaching
norm perform better (conditional on the existence of a teaching norm and
funding)?
The model captures the interplay between a cultural norm and a finan-
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cial incentive and inquires how a teaching standard and the funding affect
the optimal contract. It would be interesting to extend the model to consider
asymmetric information between the government and the university, study 
different reference groups for peer pressure, and inquire how the university
should regulate the social norm(s).
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Appendix
The agent’s base wage
Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The university chooses the lowest base wage, w0(α),
compatible with participation, i.e., UA0 = U
A(α,w). That is, w0(α) = UA0 −UA(α, 0).
For a given α, the agent attains his or her reservation utility, UA0 , with the following
base wage:

















• w0(α) = UA0 − 12 t
2 if α ≤ tk. That is, when e∗r (α) = 0 and e∗t (α) = t (i.e.,
eUt = t). Hence, for the agent to participate it must be the case that m ≥
UA0 − 12 t
2 > 0.
• w0(α) = UA0 − 12α
2 if α ≥ λt/k. That is, when e∗r (α) = α and e∗t (α) = 0
(i.e., eUt = 0). As UA increases without bound when α ≥ λt/k, we have:




The optimal marginal research reward: αm
Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. αm is the optimal marginal research reward when the
university spends its entire budget m. αm is derived by solving the following ex-
pression (where m = w0 (α) + αe∗r (α); e∗r(α) is given by (4); and w0 (α) is defined
above):































Note that αm ≥ tk and that αm is non-decreasing in m.
See Figure 1 for an illustration.
The optimal marginal research reward: αm ≤ αt
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Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. We consider the case where m ≤ m. That is, αm ≤ αt.
Let α∗ (m) be the solution in α to








where e∗r(α) and e∗t (α) are given by (4) and (5). We have:
α∗ (m) =
−λ(1− λ)tk + (λ− k2)
√






−λ(1− λ)k + λ2t(λ− k2)
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∂t is decreasing in m − U
A











k . When m− U
A
0 = −12 t
2
(which corresponds to the polar case where eUt = t and αt = kt),
∂α∗(m)
∂t = k.
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